As Bashar al-Assad flees for Russia, Syrian rebel groups – primarily the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – have begun uncovering large stashes of captagon, a popular amphetamine-like pill which the Assad regime has long been accused of being complicit with the illicit trade or actively producing.
Videos surfaced online of millions of pills in regime-linked buildings, such as the Mezzeh military airport, as well as an industrial-scale pill factory tied to Maher Al-Assad (Bashar’s brother). These videos, according to Caroline Rose, an expert in the captagon trade and a Director at New Lines Institute, indicate that “researchers, analysts, and journalists were in fact correct in assessing the strong level of involvement from the Syrian regime in the captagon trade.”
As Syria’s economy collapsed in a brutal civil war which began in 2011 – with the nation’s GDP shrinking by more than half between 2010 and 2020 – captagon production bloomed. Fenethylline, originally synthesised and branded as captagon in Germany to treat narcolepsy and ADHD in the 1960s onwards, was swiftly banned due to its psychoactive effects. What is available on the market today as “captagon” across the Middle East, however, barely resembles the original drug’s formulation; nowadays it is more of a cocktail of stimulants, although still pressed with the characteristic C from its original branding.
The value of captagon’s trade for the Syrian economy is unparalleled: several sources have underscored how it is the country’s most valuable export, “dwarfing” the dwindling economy. Some estimates have put the captagon trade’s value at $5.7 billion in 2022, according to New Lines Institute; others, like the British government, have inflated its value to a $57 billion annual industry. Regardless of its dimension, captagon was a key source of funds for the Assad regime during economic struggles. It was also a tool for diplomatic power, with the regime using its control over captagon’s flow to leverage its reintegration into the Arab League in 2023. As a result, many analysts accused Assad’s Syria of becoming a narco-state.
The videos leaked offer a prior unseen perspective into captagon factories, with journalists from Reuters, Channel 4, and more accompanying rebel forces to seize the drug stockpiles and production equipment. Thousands of pills at the Douma factory were found hidden inside fruit, furniture, pebbles and voltage stabilisers. Most captagon was trafficked through neighbouring Jordan, Iraq, or Lebanon before reaching the final destination of more profitable consumer markets like Saudi Arabia. The amount which enters Saudi Arabia is unknown; however, a 2019 study analysed law enforcement reports which identified almost 400 million pills entering the nation from 2012 to 2016. In 2021, 73 tonnes of amphetamine pills were seized by border authorities.
A Jordanian official told National News that since the fall of Assad, the constant flow of captagon pills across the border – sometimes millions of pills a day – has all but dried up. An Iraqi official also confirmed a drop in its trafficking. But this won’t last forever.
What next for Captagon?
The future of the captagon trade will largely be shaped by the successor of Assad’s rule. Currently, HTS appears well-positioned to hold power in Syria. Their leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, gave a victory speech where he stated that under Assad, Syria had “become the world’s leading source of Captagon,” but under his rule, “Syria is being purified.”
Stockpiles of captagon have been burned or poured down drains, though it is unverifiable if this was done by HTS-affiliated actors or ordinary citizens. HTS’s desire to rid the country of its trade may be part of an attempt to legitimise their power internationally, as they are considered a terrorist organisation by the United Nations Security Council.
However, there are some doubts over the legitimacy of HTS’s commitment to eradicating captagon. Some members of the group have been accused of participating in the trade of captagon and other drugs, with one trafficker claiming to have sold captagon to the group.
Despite this, in HTS-controlled areas, before they had seized power, the group frequently captured captagon pills and clashed with smugglers. As a result, Rose told TalkingDrugs, “HTS will likely crack down on industrial-scale production, like the ones we saw in Douma [a city near Damascus].” They may not, however, be able to eradicate its domestic production.
”They may not have the capacity to curtail small-scale manufacturing facilities and trafficking nodes across Syria,” Rose added.
While a crackdown on the previously open production and exporting of captagon is expected, it seems unlikely that HTS will be able to completely eradicate its production. This is often the case with established illegal drug markets: Afghanistan has had similar issues with maintaining its national ban on opium production. While it has been seriously reduced, pockets of areas have kept up poppy cultivation and opium production.
Spillover in production
Captagon’s production could also spill over into neighbouring states. Lebanon, for example, has long had small-scale captagon production, and Hezbollah – a close ally of Assad – is often associated with its regional trade. Hezbollah is not the only actor that will seek to continue the lucrative trade, Rose told TalkingDrugs.
“Many regime-aligned and affiliated actors will seek to shift production and trafficking activities to existing transit countries and emerging sites for production, such as Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, and Lebanon,” she said.
As seen in the expansion of production and subsequent creation of new consumer markets in Lebanon and Iraq, Rose continues, “It’s possible that with this shift, they will also seek to carve out new sites for demand.”
For people who use captagon, this will be a time of instability. Rose told TalkingDrugs, that as prices increase because “of the sudden shortfall in supply with so many industrial-scale captagon manufacturing facilities shut down”, this “may induce some consumers to seek out alternative stimulants, such as methamphetamine – which has historically been produced in both Iran and Afghanistan.
The future of Syria and the captagon trade are intertwined in their instability and unpredictability. The trade’s key player has fallen, which is an equal opportunity to cull the size of the illicit trade and new potential profits and involvement for criminal actors across the region. As long as there is demand, the production and trafficking routes will shift and mould to fit that demand. Captagon isn’t going anywhere.
