Before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria controlled an estimated 80% of the global Captagon trade thanks to state-level production and trafficking. Since Syria’s new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham interim government under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa came to power, they have committed to completely dismantling the Captagon trade, allegedly seizing all production sites and eradicating remaining stockpiles.
But, with Captagon so entrenched in Syria’s political and economic fabric, signs that its trade is ongoing through militia groups, and with appointments of key narco-actors in the new government, serious doubts remain about the country’s ability or interest in leaving this profitable industry behind. Recent evidence of Europe’s complicity in Captagon’s trafficking has emerged, as the bloc’s liberal customs regulations are facilitating the drug’s movement into the Middle East. This supply route is complicating the eradication of Captagon’s trade in the region, and needs addressing.
Captagon under Assad
Captagon, the commercial name for the synthetic stimulant fenethylline, was first developed in the 1960s by German company Degussa Pharma Gruppe. It was originally prescribed for disorders like narcolepsy, attention deficit disorders and depression. Because it was also found to have addictive and hallucinogenic properties, it was never approved for medical use. In 1986, it became a Schedule 2 controlled substance under the UN Psychotropic Substances Act 1971, leading to its global prohibition.
As Syria fell into civil war in 2011 between the Assad regime and armed opposition forces, mass destruction and economic crises spread throughout the country. Western and Arab economic sanctions due to news of human rights abuses only worsened the economic situation. The Captagon trade emerged as an illegal yet profitable revenue stream for the Assad regime.
By 2022, Captagon exports far exceeded Syria’s exports of legal products combined, according to estimates by Agence France-Presse. President Bashar Al-Assad and his brother, Maher Al-Assad, head of the 4th Armoured Division and Military Intelligence Directorate, oversaw its trade, with Maher playing a central role in its trafficking by protecting its production and trafficking routes.
Between 2020 and 2022, Captagon generated an estimated US$7.3 billion in Syria and Lebanon, contributing approximately US$2.4 billion annually to both countries’ economies through sales to major consumer markets like Saudi Arabia. The drug has also been used as a geopolitical tool, leveraging the drug’s international trafficking to re-join the Arab League in 2023 after having its membership suspended at the beginning of the civil war. Despite these claims, the Assad regime denied their involvement in the Captagon industry until the very last moment.
The fall of the regime and dismantling of Captagon’s trade
On the 27 November 2024, the Syrian Islamist Militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched an aggressive offensive with allied rebel factions. Within 12 days, the Assad regime fell, and Bashar Al-Assad fled to Russia. With Israel simultaneously waging war on Assad’s allies, Hamas and Hezbollah, the regime was unable to maintain a hold on power.
Within four months, the new government, alongside Jordan, seized over 200 million Captagon pills in former regime strongholds. While HTS are publicly committed to eradicating the Captagon trade in Syria, experts are concerned on whether the new government has the technological capacity, funds, and institutional resilience for such a large-scale counternarcotics operation. These concerns will remain while demand for the drug persists and illegal markets seek alternative criminal organisations to pick up Captagon’s trade.
Has Syria left its Captagon past behind?
There are indications that the Captagon trade is still happening in Syria months after HTS’ initial crackdown, most notably large seizures in neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia. The UN’s Office of Drugs and Crime has confirmed that seizures of Captagon are still high since HTS’ takeover; its trade remains strong, most likely due to existing stockpiles of the drug.
Alongside concerns for the new Syrian government’s ability to fully dismantle its trade, few arrests of key Captagon traffickers have been made. In fact, there are signs that Assad-affiliated traffickers are still working in the Captagon trade, using their knowledge and network to maintain smuggling routes from Northern Syria into Turkey, working with other militia groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon.
President Ahmed al-Sharaa has also failed to dispel doubts of collusion with key figures of Captagon’s trade. There are reports that al-Sharaa continues to broker deals with narco-leaders, even appointing Ali al Miqdad, a suspected drug trafficker, as head of military intelligence – a role previously held by Assad’s brother. Such deals involve granting amnesty from previous sanctions with the presumed aim of neutralising political opposition and creating unity in the country.
Speaking to TalkingDrugs, Alexander Söderholm of the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) said that there’s good evidence of Captagon ongoing production in Syria.
“There are signs that cross-border networks are still involved in the Captagon trade in Lebanon and Syria, facilitating the access to precursors and other essential chemicals, production equipment and onwards trafficking. In some areas, it is likely that armed actors continue to benefit from or protect parts of this supply chain”.
However, Söderholm did note that the new Syrian government’s actions on Captagon may lead to changes in its contents.
“If there is sustained disruption of the Captagon market, where for example producers’ ties to suppliers of chemicals and essential equipment are severed, they need to decide whether to continue producing Captagon, and if so, what they put into their product,” he commented.
“Currently, the region is facing a significant challenge in relation to the high availability of methamphetamine. If these low-cost methamphetamine markets become entrenched – Captagon producers may begin using methamphetamine as a substitute for amphetamine. The potential public health consequences of this could be significant.”
UNODC highlighted how closely linked the Captagon and methamphetamine trade is: its 2025 World Drug Report showed the geographical proximity of both drug’s trade, suggesting a potential crossover in actors and markets.
Europe’s Captagon complicity
There are increasing concerns that Captagon traffickers are taking advantage of faults in European port security (particularly in Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands) to facilitate the drug’s movement into key Middle Eastern markets. A recent EUDA report unveiled how the European customs system, with lower internal inspection rates and liberalised shipping regulations, has been exploited by Captagon traffickers, who ship the drug into the EU, repackage it there and traffic it back to the consumer region (particularly the Gulf) under falsified documentation.
Söderholm confirmed with TalkingDrugs that the EU’s liberal shipping regulations make the bloc an attractive option for traffickers in the Middle East.
“Captagon seizures in Europe have been consistently low since peaking in 2020. [This] might reflect a change in methods or routes used by traffickers, or in our capacity to stop these shipments. Nevertheless, Europe remains mainly a transit hub for Captagon, not a destination market.”
To reduce the EU’s role in facilitating Captagon’s trade, the EUDA recommended expanding collaboration between European ports to ensure more tracking and shared technical drug detection knowledge.
A new dawn for Syrian Captagon?
The fall of the Assad regime has marked a significant shift for Syria and Captagon. The interim government has made substantial progress towards dismantling the trade, but they lack the institutional capabilities to fully deploy an effect counternarcotic operation.
There is still substantial evidence the drug’s trade is ongoing: militia networks continue to exploit systemic corruption within the region, finding new and sophisticated ways to produce and traffic Captagon. HTS appointing key narco-figures like Ali al Migdad to the government may be a strategic move to consolidate control over the country, helping the emerging state work with, rather than against, organised criminal groups.
As with most drug markets worldwide, it seems that there is neither the capacity (nor whole-hearted interest) in eradicating Captagon from Syria.
